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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN VIRGINIA 
W. Hamilton Bryson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The political will of the people of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia is expressed in the Constitution of Virginia, which created 
the government of Virginia. Every Constitution of Virginia from 
1776 to the present has divided the government among the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia, the legislature; the governor, who is 
the chief executive officer; and the judiciary, a system of courts.1 
Each of these three branches of the government was created as a 
separate, independent branch of the government.2 However, they 
are not totally independent; they must of necessity interact. Fur-
thermore, each Constitution of Virginia has put into place various 
checks and balances among them. 3 
* Blackstone Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1963, 
Hampden-Sydney College; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1968, University of 
Virginia School of Law; Ph.D., 1972, University of Cambridge. The author would like to 
thank the Richmond, Virginia law firm of Hunton & Williams, LLP, for a summer re-
search grant which generously facilitated and supported the writing of this article. 
1. See, e.g., VA. CONST. arts. IV-VI. A fourth branch of the government, the State 
Corporation Commission, was created by the Virginia Constitution of 1902, but this does 
not impinge on the subject of this article. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. XII,§ 153. 
2. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 1; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I,§ 5; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. II; 
VA. CONST. of 1851, art. II; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. II; VA. CONST. of 1776, art. III. 
3. See generally 1 A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
VIRGINIA (1974) (discussing the evolution and operation of the Constitution of Virginia); 
THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975) (analyzing the role of the Supreme Court of Virginia in relation to other 
branches of Virginia state government); MARGARET VIRGINIA NELSON, A STUDY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928 (1947) (discussing the role of judicial review in 
Virginia); 4C MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA, Constitutional 
Law § 27 (Repl. Vol. 1999) (discussing the interplay between separation of powers and a 
system of checks and balances); John Thomas Wren, Republican Jurisprudence: Virginia 
Law and the New Order, 1776-1830 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, College of 
William and Mary) (on file with the author). 
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The purpose of this essay is to consider the constitutional place 
of the judiciary of Virginia in relation to the legislative branch of 
the government. This is because before the Virginia Constitution 
of 1971, the governor was not given a strong position in the gov-
ernment-a reaction to the very strong position of the governor of 
Virginia during the colonial period.4 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BRANCHES 
There are two fundamental constitutional issues that define 
the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches 
of the government. The first is the independence of the courts to 
decide cases brought before them according to the rule of law and 
not according to the desires of a single person or of a group of per-
sons, including the governor or the legislature. The law can be 
changed by an act of the legislature signed by the governor, but 
even so, there are limits.5 The second is the separation of gov-
ernmental powers among the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary. The General Assembly cannot interfere with the consti-
tutional authority of, and mandate to, the judiciary to determine 
cases brought before it for decision.6 Until recently, there have 
been only a very few incidents that have raised the issue of the 
independence of the judiciary. 
In order to preserve the independence of the judiciary, the leg-
islature is forbidden to diminish the salary or term of office of a 
sitting judge.7 Even the possibility of such diminishment might 
influence or intimidate a judge in the performance of his or her 
official judicial duties. 
4. Compare VA. CONST. art. V, with VA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX. 
5. For example, no bill of attainder or ex post facto law may be enacted. VA. CoNST. 
art. I,§ 9. 
6. See VA. CONST. art. III,§ 1 (separating powers among the branches). 
7. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 9; VA. CONST. of1776 art. XN. 
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III. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE JUDICIARY 
A Appointment 
In 1788, such an incident arose. Even though it was inadver-
tent, the appellate court judges reacted instantly. In early 1788, 
the General Assembly attempted to reorganize the high courts in 
such a way that it happened that the judges' workload would 
have been substantially increased with no increase in pay.8 The 
judges on the Court of Appeals of Virginia9 declared the act un-
constitutional because it interfered with the independence of the 
judiciary and violated the constitutional provision for the separa-
tion of powers within the state government.10 In response, the 
governor called the General Assembly into special session to re-
spond to the problem.11 The result was an amicable compromise. 
The courts were reorganized in a different way so that no sitting 
judge would be required to accept additional judicial duties, 12 and 
the judges voluntarily resigned their commissions in the old 
courts and accepted new commissions in the new Court of Ap-
peals.13 Thus, it was established that an act of assembly could 
neither increase the judicial workload of sitting judges nor re-
move them from their judicial offices and that this was a matter 
of constitutionallaw.14 
8. Act Establishing District Courts, ch. 39, § 3, 12 Va. Stat. 535-36 (Hening 1823). 
9. The first name of the highest court in Virginia after Independence was the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. Act for Establishing a Court of Appeals, ch. 12, 9 Va. Stat. 522 (Hen-
ing 1778). In 1830, its name was changed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
VA. CONST., art. V, § 1 (1830); see also VA. CONST., § 14 (1776). However, the court contin-
ued to be informally referred to as the Court of Appeals of Virginia. See, e.g., 39 Va. (12 
Leigh) (reporting cases as "argued and determined in the Court of Appeals ... "). In 1971, 
the court's name changed to the Supreme Court ofVirginia. VA. CONST., art. VI, §1 (1971); 
2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 706. 
10. Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788). This case 
may also be found as Remonstrance of the Court of Appeals to the Gen. Assembly, 3 Va. (1 
Va. Cas.) 98 (1788). For additional information regarding this case, see 2 THE LEITERS 
AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, at 504 (David John Mays ed., 1967). 
11. 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANuSCRIPTS 440-41 (Wil-
liam P. Palmer ed., 1884). 
12. An Act for Amending the Act, Intituled an Act Constituting the Court of Appeals, 
ch. 68, 12 Va. Stat. 764 (Hening 1823). 
13. See 2 DAVID JOHN MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON 1721-1803: A BIOGRAPHY 273-75 
(1952); Margaret V. Nelson, The Cases of the Judges: Fact or Fiction?, 31 VA. L. REV. 243, 
246-4 7 (1944). 
14. See generally 2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 692-94 (discussing Cases of the Judges 
of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, and its impact on the Constitution ofVirginia). 
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Although it is the constitutional function of the legislature to 
make and change the law, interpreting the Constitution, a legal 
document, is a matter of law, and the interpretation of the law is 
the function of the judiciary.15 Thus, the courts are to review the 
acts of the other branches of the government as a matter of con-
stitutionallaw.16 One aspect of Virginia constitutional law is the 
separation of powers among the branches of government, and this 
requires that the judiciary give great deference to the legislature 
when construing a statute. For the judiciary to legislate would be 
for the court unconstitutionally to usurp the legislative function 
of the General Assembly. A corollary to this principle is that 
when confronted by a constitutional issue in a legislative act, the 
court should, if it can, resolve the issue without declaring an act 
of assembly unconstitutional. A good example of this is the case of 
Commonwealth v. Caton. 17 This case involved an attempted legis-
lative pardon for treason.18 Edmund Pendleton and the majority 
of the Court, with impressive legal skill, avoided the constitu-
tional issue although George Wythe was willing to indulge in an 
unseemly constitutional confrontation with the legislature.19 
The only serious clash between the judiciary and the legisla-
ture in Virginia history took place in the 1870s and 1880s. It was 
a major crisis that resulted in the entire Court of Appeals not be-
ing re-elected, but rather being replaced with an entirely new 
bench of politically pre-committed justices. The issue was the re-
adjustment of the state debt. 20 
After the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia was faced with a huge debt that dated in 
large part from before the War, but the treasury of Virginia had 
been looted during Reconstruction. Furthermore, the private sec-
tor of Virginia had been economically destroyed during the War. 
The new Virginia Constitution of 1870 looked to universal public 
15. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 25 (1793) (stating that "[t]he interpre-
tation of the laws is the proper and particular province of the courts"). 
16. See id. at 82-83; see generally 2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 694-95 (discussing ju-
dicial review). 
17. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782). 
18. Id. at 8-9; see also Act Declaring What Shall Be Treason, ch. 3, § 3, 9 Va. Stat. 168 
(Hening 1823). 
19. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7. 
20. For an in-depth account of the Readjuster Movement, see CHARLES CHILTON 
PEARSON, THE READJUSTER MOVEMENT IN VIRGINIA (1917). 
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education, 21 but there was not enough money to pay for it and 
also to pay the public debt or even the interest on the debt. 22 
Thus, the political issue of the day that divided Virginia into two 
hostile war camps was whether to pay the debt, or at least the in-
terest that was due upon it, or to repudiate the state debt, or at 
least the interest that had accrued during the hostilities of the 
1860s, so that public education and other pressing social needs 
could be financed. The Funders wanted to pay at least the inter-
est on the state debt and thereby maintain the financial integrity 
of the Commonwealth and thus assure the future access to 
credit.23 The Readjusters wanted to scale back the state debt, or 
at least the accrued interest, so that much needed social pro-
grams could be available for the people of the Commonwealth, 
who certainly needed them at that impoverished and unhappy 
time.24 
In December 1879, the Readjusters, who were led by General 
William Mahone,25 were elected to a large majority of the General 
Assembly; and, in 1882, all of the justices of the Court of Appeals 
came up for re-election, but none of them were re-elected.26 The 
sitting justices were thought to be Funders, and the bondholders, 
who were led by William L. Royall,27 were arguing that the read-
justment of the state debt was an unconstitutional abridgment of 
vested contract rights.28 Thus, in order to assure the judicial ap-
proval of the legislation scaling back the state debt, the General 
Assembly elected an entirely new court of judges who were known 
to be Readjusters. 29 Since 1788, there had been no attempted leg-
islative interference with the judiciary until this.30 
21. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII,§ 3. 
22. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 111-12. 
23. ld. at 115-16. 
24. See JACK P. MADDEX, JR., THE VIRGINIA CONSERVATIVES 1867-1879: A STUDY IN 
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 233-55 (1970); see also ALLEN W. MOGER, VIRGINIA: 
BOURBONISM TO BYRD, 1870-1925, at 37-38 (1968). 
25. See MOGER supra note 24, at 37; see also NELSON MOREHOUSE BLAKE, WILLIAM 
MAHONE OF VIRGINIA: SOLDIER AND POLITICAL INSURGENT (1935). 
26. NELSON, supra note 3, at 118. 
27. See generally WILLIAM L. ROYALL, SOME REMINISCENCES 100-09 (1909) (recount-
ing the dispute between the Funders and the Readjusters). 
28. See William L. Royall, Constitutionality of the Funding Bill, 2 VA. L.J. 129, 146 
(1878); William Green, The Funding Act, 2 VA. L.J. 193, 194-209 (1878). But see JAMES 
LYONS, THE FUNDING BILL: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL (1878); JAMES MOORE, TwO PATHS TO 
THE NEW SOUTH: THE VIRGINIA DEBT CONTROVERSY, 1870-1883, at 17 (1974). 
29. NELSON, supra note 3, at 110-20. 
30. Geo. L. Christian, The Judicial Term of Office in Virginia, 4 VA. L.J. 1, 14 (1880). 
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The denouement was that, at first, the bondholders appeared 
to have lost the fight, but, ultimately, they changed their legal 
tactics and the Supreme Court of the United States upheld their 
rights.31 By 1894, when the Court of Appeals ofVirginia came up 
for re-election again, the Readjusters had lost their political 
power, and the General Assembly refused to re-elect any of those 
judges-putting in an entirely new bench of justices again.32 
Whether this wholesale change in the personnel of the Court 
was an attempt to intimidate the judges or to manipulate the re-
sults of future litigation, or whether it was simply a matter of 
crass political patronage, it was regrettable. The judicial selection 
process should be aimed at putting the most talented and well-
educated legal minds on the bench in furtherance of the admini-
stration of impartial justice. The performance of the General As-
sembly in 1882 was poor. In terms of judicial independence, it 
was a disgraceful episode. 
Even though it was a poor performance, there are some consid-
erations that help put the matter into perspective. The Court of 
Appeals before 1870 was only infrequently presented with consti-
tutional issues to decide.33 However, from then on, litigants put 
many constitutional cases before the judges, and, before 1882, 
several had involved the state debt issue. 34 The courts cannot 
avoid hearing a constitutional case. The courts are open to every-
one who can pay a nominal filing fee or get the court to waive it. 
This includes foreigners as well as citizens, with the exception of 
enemies of the state. It is the courts' purpose, the reason for their 
existence, to decide issues of law. The constitution is a legal 
document, and if a litigant argues that a statute is void because it 
is unconstitutional, the courts must decide the issue one way or 
the other. Thus, the Court of Appeals was drawn into the politi-
31. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 693 (1890). See generally John V. Orth, The 
Virginia State Debt and the Judicial Power of the United States, 1870-1920, in 
AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 106 (David J. Bodenhamer & 
James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984). 
32. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 22-23. To avoid such a wholesale tumover in the highest 
court of the Commonwealth in the future, the Virginia Constitution of 1902 provided that 
the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals would be elected in staggered classes. See VA. 
CONST. of 1902, art. VI, § 91. 
33. See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 12-13; NELSON, supra note 3, at 32. 
34. See, e.g., Clarke v. Tyler, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 134 (1878); Wise Bros. v. Rogers, 65 
Va. (24 Gratt.) 169 (1873); Antoni v. Wright, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 833 (1872); see also 
NELSON, supra note 3, at 113-19 (discussing litigation regarding state debt). 
2004] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN VIRGINIA 711 
cally sensitive issue of the state debt by the general public and 
could not have avoided the difficulties. Even though the General 
Assembly had been elected expressly to readjust the state debt, 
the legislature and the general public were still bound by the con-
stitutions of the United States and Virginia. The legislative ma-
nipulation of the courts in 1882, however well intentioned, was an 
attempt to manipulate the course of justice, and statesmen would 
have acted otherwise. 
B. Removal from Office 
In seventeenth century England, the independence of the judi-
ciary was severely threatened by the arbitrary removal of judges 
from their places in court.35 Having judges who are independent 
from the politicians and who can adjudicate according to the rule 
of law is a political right that was hard fought against the crown. 
The king finally was forced to accept this principle with the Act of 
Settlement of 1701.36 The Virginia patriots were well aware of 
British constitutional history, and this concept of judicial inde-
pendence was firmly embedded in the first Constitution of Vir-
ginia in 1776, which required that the appellate judges, once 
elected by the General Assembly, shall "continue in office during 
good behaviour."37 
The Virginia Constitution of 1851 took away what was the 
equivalent of life tenure of the judges and provided for a term of 
years.38 At the same time, it also took away the election of the 
appellate judges by the legislature and made all judges subject to 
election by the general voting populace.39 One member of the 
35. See W. H. BRYSON, THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER: ITS JURISDICTION 
ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES AND RECORDS 52-57 (1975); Alfred F. Havighurst, The Ju· 
diciary and Politics in the Reign of Charles II, 66 L.Q. REV. 62, 76-77 (1950); C. H. Mcll· 
wain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 217, 219 .(1913). 
36. An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the Rights 
and Liberties of the Subject, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, § 3, cl. 7 (1701) (Eng.); see also W. S. 
Holdsworth, The Constitutional Position of the Judges, 48 L.Q. REV. 25 (1932). 
37. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV; see also VA. CONST. of 1830, art. V, § 1. 
38. VA. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 10. 
39. VA. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 27, 34. See generally ROBERT P. SU'ITON, 
REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 126-27, 152-53 
(1989) (discussing the evolution of the judiciary in Virginia); Alex B. Long, An Historical 
Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and West Virginia, 18 J.L. & POL. 
691, 730-66 (2002) (providing an overview of the historical development of Virginia's judi· 
cial selection process). 
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Convention argued for this in order to make judges independent 
of the legislature.40 He thought that the legislative election of 
judges violated the general principle of the separation of govern-
mental powers.41 It is to be remembered that, at that time, the 
county courts had administrative as well as judicial duties within 
their counties and could levy local taxes.42 It was thus a reform 
long overdue at the county court level. Whether it was a good idea 
at the appellate court level is highly questionable. 
The Constitution of 1870 made all of the judges of Virginia sub-
ject to election by the General Assembly. They were to be elected 
for a term of years with the possibility of re-election-the terms 
being reasonably lengthy. 43 The reason for this return to the for-
mer system of selecting judges was that the legislators wished to 
use the judgeships for the purposes of political patronage.44 It is, I 
believe, only coincidental that, at this time, the administration of 
the counties was taken away from the county courts and put into 
the hands oflocally elected boards of supervisors.45 This system of 
judicial selection has continued to the present.46 
This system of judicial selection provides a political check on 
the judiciary by the legislature. There is a periodic review of all 
judges by the General Assembly which balances the judges' power 
to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional. Where both 
sides act with statesmanship, the system works extremely well. 
The bad example is the Readjusters' refusal to re-elect any of the 
sitting judges in Virginia in the late nineteenth century.47 
Not only is the Virginia judiciary subject to election and regu-
lar, i.e. predictable, re-election by the legislature, it is also theo-
retically liable to removal by the General Assembly through the 
40. Waitman T. Willey, Speech Before the Committee of the Whole (June 20, 1851), in 
WAlTMAN T. WILLEY, SPEECHES OF W AITMA.t'< T. WILLEY OF MONONGALIA COUNTY, BEFORE 
THE STATE CONVENTIO•N OF VIRGINIA, ON THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION; ON COUNTY 
COURTS & COUNTY ORGANIZATION, AND ON THE ELECTION OF JUDGES BY THE PEOPLE 34--42 
(1851). 
41. Id. 
42. VA. CODE ch. 47, § 11 (1849); id. ch. 53, §§ 3-5; 2 VA. CODE REV. ch. 191, § 6 
(1819). 
43. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13, and 14. 
44. MADDEX, supra note 24, at 92-93. 
45. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VII. 
46. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 7; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. VI, §§ 91, 96, 99. See generally 2 
HOWARD, supra note 3, at 739-46 (discussing the selection of judges). 
47. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 110-20. 
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impeachment process.48 The Virginia Constitution of 1776 pro-
vided for impeachment ofjudges by the House of Delegates with a 
subsequent trial in the Court of Appeals.49 The Constitution of 
1830 moved trials upon impeachments to the Senate of Virginia 
where a two-thirds vote was required for a conviction and re-
moval from office.50 This latter procedure has been included in 
every constitution since 1830.51 In addition, the Constitution of 
1830 provided for the legislative removal of judges without a trial 
upon a two-thirds vote of both houses of the General Assembly. 52 
This provision continued in force until the 1971 Constitution.53 
The impeachment procedure originated in England.54 The fa-
mous impeachments of several judges in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were well known to the drafters of the first 
Constitution of Virginia. The most notable were: Sir Francis Ba-
con, lord chancellor;55 the judges who ruled in favor of the ship 
money tax;56 and the Earl of Macclesfield, another lord chancel-
lor.57 Even though major political motives guided all of those im-
peachments, nevertheless, the founding fathers of Virginia be-
lieved that this legislative power was a desirable check on the 
judiciary. It is to be remembered that, under the constitutions of 
1776 and 1830, the judges held office during good behavior, which 
meant, in effect, for life, but for the possibility ofimpeachment.58 
No judge of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the new Court of 
Appeals of Virginia has been removed from the bench either by 
impeachment or by legislative recall.59 However, there have been 
two removals of lower court judges. In 1903, Judge Clarence 
48. VA. CONST. art. N, § 17. See generally 1 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 552-58 (dis-
cussing impeachment in Virginia). 
49. VA. CONST. of1776, art. XVII. 
50. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 13. 
51. VA. CONST. art. N, § 17; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. N, § 54; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. 
V, § 16; VA. CONST. of 1851, art. N, § 18. 
52. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. V, § 6. 
53. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. VI,§ 104; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VI,§ 23; VA. CONST. of 
1851, art. VI,§ 17. 
54. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1-4 (1973); 
see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3 (2d ed. 2000). 
55. 1 F. HARGRAVE, STATE TRIALS 375 (1776). 
56. Id. at 505, 696-719. 
57. 6 F. HARGRAVE, STATE TRIALS 477 (1777). 
58. VA. CONST. of1830, art. V, § 1; VA. CONST. of1776, art. XIV. 
59. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 58. 
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Jackson Campbell, judge of the County Court of Amherst County, 
was removed from the bench by legislative recall for assaulting a 
preacher who had insulted him.6° Charles H. Crawford, a Baptist 
preacher, who was the agent of the rabid Anti-Saloon League of 
America, publicly defamed the judge because he granted a liquor 
license to a pharmacist, and the preacher, when he refused to 
apologize, was made to feel the sharp impact of the judge's horse 
whip.61 Complaints were lodged in the General Assembly, and 
Judge Campbell's judicial career came to an end.62 In 1922, the 
people of Amherst County elected him to the House of Delegates; 
one of his committee assignments was the Committee for Courts 
of Justice.63 
In 1908, Judge John Wise Gillet Blackstone of the Circuit 
Court of Elizabeth City County was removed by legislative recall 
for dereliction of his duties by failing to appear in court when it 
was opened for the day's sitting.64 Everyone knew very well where 
the judge was, and the sheriff went there to remind him that the 
court was awaiting his appearance.65 However, Judge Blackstone 
refused to leave the house of prostitution where he was staying.66 
In the words of the report of the House of Delegates Committee 
for Courts of Justice: 
[The sherifl1 again found him alone in bed at the same place [a house 
of ill-fame in the town of Phoebus]. Whilst the sheriff was in the 
room several lewd women entered in their night gowns. One of the 
women got on the bed occupied by Judge Blackstone; whereupon the 
sheriff smacked her and told her to get out of the way .... 67 
This was a public scandal which caused a local furor; petitions 
were sent to the General Assembly, and the judge was removed 
from the bench. 68 
60. 1902-04 VA. SENATE JOURNAL 331-35, 444-52, 490, 568-74, 649, and 677; 1902-
04 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 436-43, 447-49, 600-07; A.~SWER OF C. J. 
CAMPBELL, Va. Gen. Assembly, S. Doc. No.7, at 2-10 (Reg. Sess. 1903). 
61. 2 DICTIONARY OF VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY 559-60 (Sara B. Bearss et al. eds., 2001). 
62. !d. at 560. 
63. ld. at 559-60; see also E. GRIFFITH DODSON, THE GENERAL AsSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 1919-1939: REGISTER INCLUDING MEMBERS OF 1933 
CONVENTION 225 (1939). 
64. 1908 VA. SENATE JOURNAL 943. 
65. ld. 
66. ld. 
67. ld. 
68. See 1908 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 379-83, 716-21, 1023-31; 1908 VA. 
SENATE JOURNAL 941-46; see also Brooks M. Barnes, The Sins of John W. G. Blackstone 
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In 1871, Judge Alexander Mahood of the Fourteenth Judicial 
Circuit was accused of being drunk while sitting on the bench as 
a circuit court judge.69 However, insufficient proof was offered, 
and the House of Delegates voted against his removal. 70 
Again, in 1944, the legislature attempted to remove a judge; 
this time it was Judge Alonzo B. Carney of the Circuit Court of 
Norfolk County. The first attempt was to get the Supreme Court 
of Appeals to declare him to be incapacitated.71 However, the 
court ruled that there was no showing of any physical or mental 
incapacity, and the court suggested that the constitutional proce-
dures for judicial removal should not be circumvented by using 
the statute as a ruse. 72 The House of Delegates then voted to re-
move him on the ground that he had agreed with his predecessor 
that, if he would retire, he, Carney, would share his salary with 
him.73 However, the Senate refused to follow, and the judge re-
mained on the bench. 74 
Perhaps the reason for the infrequent use of the impeachment 
process is because it is politically and procedurally cumbersome. 
Except in the most outrageous situations involving public scan-
dal, it is easier simply to allow an unworthy or incompetent judge 
to finish his or her term of office and then not re-elect. This 
means that the General Assembly does not have to deal with an 
unpleasant situation. However, the local bar has to stand be-
tween the unfit judge and the general public to ameliorate the 
bad situation which will soon come discreetly to a quiet end. 
14, 31-32 (Apr. 29, 1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Historical So-
ciety). 
69. 1870-71 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 146, 183. 
70. Id. at 231, 308, 346. 
71. See Act of Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 441, § 5, 1942 Va. Acts 706. 
72. See In re Carney, 182 Va. 907, 908-10, 30 S.E.2d 789, 789-790 (1944). 
73. See 1945 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 25~3. 
74. See 1945 VA. SENATE JOURNAL 190-91. 
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IV. STRIKING A BALANCE 
To resolve situations of judicial misbehavior without having to 
resort to a legislative impeachment, the Virginia Constitution of 
1971 provided for the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.75 
This allows the judiciary to regulate itself. 76 The Commission, 
which is elected by the General Assembly, hears complaints 
against judges and investigates them.77 If the investigation re-
veals facts that warrant further action, the Commission prose-
cutes the judge in a formal trial before the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia.78 The court then hears evidence and argument and may 
reprimand or remove the judge from office.79 Under the firm lead-
ership of Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, this procedure has been 
very effective in assuring that the reputation of the Virginia judi-
ciary stands high. 
Since 1942, there have been statutes which provide for the re-
moval of judges by the Supreme Court of Virginia for physical or 
mental incapacit~0 and which provide for a mandatory retire-
ment age.81 In both cases, there are provisions for pensions.82 The 
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act,83 which prohibits 
generally mandatory retirement ages, does not apply to state 
court judges. 84 
The debate over the place of the judiciary within the govern-
ment centers on two issues-independence and accountability. 
The judges must be independent of external influences which will 
divert them from their duty to administer justice according to the 
75. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 10. 
76. See generally 2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 757-66 (discussing the mandate to the 
General Assembly to create the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission); MORRIS, supra 
note 3, at 58-59 (discussing the impact of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission on 
removal of judges from office in Virginia). 
77. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 10. 
78. ld. 
79. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 17.1-900 to -913 (Repl. Vol. 2003). 
80. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 10; VA. CODE ANN.§ 17.1-912 (Repl. Vol. 2003); Act 
of Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 441, 1942 Va. Acts 705. 
81. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 9; VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-305(B1) (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
82. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 51.1-306,-308 (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
83. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (2000). 
84. See Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,473 (1991). 
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rule oflaw. The judges must be accountable if they fail to do this. 
However, accountability to personal or political interests is wrong 
where it deflects or perverts the judges from the disinterested 
and impartial pursuit of the rule of law. 
The administration of the law does not allow for judicial legis-
lation where the law is clearly settled. For the judges to be able to 
change the law whenever they individually, personally feel it ap-
propriate is to upset expectations retrospectively and also to de-
stroy the law as a system; the judges would be putting themselves 
above the law. Litigants frequently raise issues oflaw, the resolu-
tion of which is in doubt; if the matter were clear, reasonable par-
ties would have settled their legal disagreements out of court. 
The courts cannot refuse to decide difficult issues of law and leave 
the parties to settle their disputes by a fistfight. However, when 
the law is clear, for the judiciary to say that it is otherwise would 
be an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative function of 
the General Assembly. However, if a statute is unconstitutional, 
it is not the law, and the courts must so declare it. This fre-
quently places the courts in difficult positions. 
Just as the legislature is not above the law, neither are the 
judges. Ignorant, foolish, and corrupt judges should be held ac-
countable. Then, the question is to whom should they be account-
able. The proponents of popular election of judges argue that the 
judiciary should be directly accountable to the voters, just as are 
the other branches of the government.85 However, a generally un-
educated populace with its natural proportion of moral depravity, 
as is that of the United States, is not competent to know when a 
judge is not proceeding according to the rule of law. Therefore, 
popular opinions as to judicial elections will be improperly ma-
nipulated by partisan politicians trying to create a political power 
base, by the news media trying to sell advertising through sensa-
tional journalism, or by sinister persons for private and selfish 
motives. 
In many states, judges run for election and re-election as part 
of a national political ticket. However, political preferences 
should not govern the issues of the administration of the rule of 
law or judicial corruption. Politics are irrelevant to such concerns. 
The news media frequently oversteps the bounds of responsible 
journalism and attempts to control the outcome of pending litiga-
85. Long, supra note 39, at 702-10, 718-23, 742-49. 
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tion. Whatever the underlying motive might be, the threat of a 
media campaign against a sitting judge who is subject to re-
election should not pervert the course of justice. One of the worst 
examples is the conviction of Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard in Cleve-
land, Ohio.86 The local newspapers decided that Dr. Sheppard was 
guilty of killing his wife, a prominent socialite, and a campaign of 
publicity was launched to have him convicted. The judge was due 
to be re-elected shortly after the trial, and the prosecutor was 
running for election to a different judgeship.87 Public pressure 
was brought to bear upon the trial procedure, and the defendant 
was convicted of murder.88 A federal court found that the news-
paper publicity was so powerful that the defendant was denied 
his right to a fair trial, and the conviction was ultimately over-
turned.89 Examples of media pressure can also be found in Vir-
ginia. In 1898, the judge of the County Court of Norfolk County 
was attacked by the press as being favorable to criminals because 
he was affording accused persons their constitutional rights: 
The misdoings of the alleged criminal referred to in the editorial 
complained of, were, at the very time of the publication, under inves-
tigation. There was a difference of opinion as to whether the locality 
of the crime was in Norfolk city or Norfolk county. The manifest ten-
dency of such a publication, at that time, was to influence and affect 
the judgment of the public, from whom the trial jury was to be se-
lected; to embarrass, obstruct and impede such investigation; to in-
fluence, direct and control the final result.90 
In that case, the editor of the newspaper was convicted of 
criminal contempt of court.91 
The balance between the freedom of the press and the inde-
pendence of the judiciary is clearly stated by Judge Prentis in 
that case: 92 
Under every form of government, which is able to maintain its own 
existence, there must always be somewhere a sovereign authority 
86. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See generally PAUL HOLMES, THE 
SHEPPARD MURDER CASE (1961) (providing a more detailed account of the Sheppard case). 
87. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 342. 
88. See id. at 335. 
89. See id. at 335-36. 
90. Elam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. Cir. 536, 536-39 (Cir. Ct. 1898) (Norfolk County). 
91. ld. at 536, 541. 
92. Judge Robert Riddick Prentis later became Chief Justice of Virginia and predeces-
sor of Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico. See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 64, 166, 170, and 174. 
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with power to enforce all of its own decrees. Under our system the 
people themselves claim and hold this ultimate sovereignty. From 
them the courts and all the other departments of the government de-
rive their limited powers. The sovereign people express their will or 
law through their agents, and when expressed all citizens owe it 
their respect and allegiance. 
The courts, by the will of the sovereign people, are intrusted with so 
much of this ultimate sovereignty as is necessary for the due admini-
stration of justice. Any attack upon them, therefore, certainly while 
in the act of administering justice, is an attack upon the sovereign 
people, whom the courts simply represent and serve. It is an assault 
upon the government which the people have ordained. Of course as 
to his private conduct and affairs, the judge cannot be accorded any 
special privilege. He must defend himself from unjust aspersions 
here just like other men. Not so when he is exercising his official du-
ties. The sorry spectacle of a judge descending from his high public 
place to vindicate his official conduct, either by personal violence or 
by a suit for damages, would be unseemly and intolerable. A wrong 
committed against him thus in his public capacity is a wrong to the 
government he represents. It should be punished not as a private in-
jury, but as a public wrong. So con tempts of court have always been 
treated, and so it must continue if the courts themselves are to con-
tinue. The judge, by the very nature of his office, is of necessity con-
stantly placed in positions of antagonism to those whose rights he 
determines. His judgments necessarily cross and thwart the pur-
poses of unsuccessful suitors. He should, as a matter of public policy, 
therefore, be protected by the whole power of the State from the ma-
licious assaults of disappointed litigants, as well as from attacks, 
criticisms and influences which would, in advance, direct and control 
his judgments for selfish and evil ends.93 
V. CONCLUSION 
719 
The Constitution of Virginia makes the judiciary independent 
of the other branches of the government.94 As for accountability, 
the popular election of judges sounds good in theory, but in prac-
tice it has proved to be a mistake. The preferable alternative is 
the present system of accountability to the legislature and to the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. The legal history of 
Virginia has proved these to be effective ways of dealing with 
situations of public scandal while protecting the impartial ad-
ministration of the rule of law. 
93. Elam, 13 Va. Cir. at 536-537. 
94. See VA. CONST. art. III,§ 1. 
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The General Assembly has not politicized the judiciary by us-
ing its re-election process to re-adjudicate or review the judges' 
administration of the rule of law as to any particular legal or so-
cial issue.95 The result is that the Virginia judiciary is fortunately 
independent of party politics when it performs its duties. It would 
be destructive of judicial independence if the legislature were to 
politicize the re-election of judges. If it were to do so, it should ex-
pect that its judiciary would join in the political process. The dec-
laration of its statutes as unconstitutional would become routine, 
and the separation of governmental powers would be upset. It 
would also seriously damage the foundation of our society, which 
is the rule of law. It is thus imperative that the legislature and 
the judiciary continue to respect the separate governmental roles 
of each other. 
95. The only exception took place long ago, when the Readjusters resorted to court-
packing politics in the 1880s. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 116-20. 
